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INTRODUCTION 
In a series of Eighth Amendment cases referred to as the Miller trilogy,1 the 
Supreme Court significantly limited the extent to which minors may be exposed to 
extreme sentences.2 Specifically, in this line of cases the Court abolished capital 
punishment for minors and narrowed the instances when minors may be sentenced 
to life without parole. Only minors convicted of homicide who are found to be “in-
corrigible” may now be subject to a death-in-custody sentence. In limiting extreme 
sentences for youth in these ways, the Supreme Court relied upon the social and 
medical science that demonstrates youth are simultaneously less culpable for their 
acts and more amenable to rehabilitation than adults. 
While the Miller trilogy has set in motion many significant juvenile justice 
reforms, youth in America are still exposed to extreme sentences—sentences that 
are disproportionate given the nature of the juvenile brain.3 Two mechanisms 
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America. © 2021, Cara H. Drinan. 
1. This term refers to Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and 
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
2. See infra Part I. 
3. In the wake of the Miller trilogy, it is also true that far too many minors continue to be exposed to life or 
virtual life sentences. See generally Cara H. Drinan, The Future of Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Sentences, in 
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND ITS FUTURE IN A NEW AGE OF PUNISHMENT (Meghan J. Ryan & William W. 
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operate to maintain this status quo.4 First, automatic transfer provisions allow chil-
dren to be charged, tried, and convicted in criminal court as if they were adults. 
This legal fiction flies in the face of the science on which the Miller trilogy was 
predicated. Second, once in adult court, youth are subject to mandatory sentencing 
schemes that were drafted with adults in mind. Again, this automatic sentencing 
without regard for the mitigating qualities of youth ignores the logic of the Miller 
trilogy. Indeed, some courts have recognized the disconnect between the Supreme 
Court’s declaration that “kids are different”5 for sentencing purposes and the 
ongoing use of automatic transfer provisions and mandatory sentencing schemes 
for youth.6 For the most part, though, courts view correction of these laws as purely 
a legislative prerogative. In this Article, I argue that, in fact, there is a clear path 
for courts to find both automatic transfer laws and mandatory minimums as applied 
to youth unlawful after Miller. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief overview of the Miller 
trilogy and the reforms that this line of cases has set in motion over the last ten years. 
Part II then discusses how the combination of automatic transfer provisions and man-
datory sentencing schemes operates to expose youth to extreme sentences notwith-
standing the Court’s recent case law holding that children are not “miniature adults.”7 
In Part III, I make the case that each of these mechanisms—transfer laws and manda-
tory minimums as applied to youth—are unconstitutional after Miller. Finally, by 
way of conclusion, I address two recurring criticisms of this thesis. 
I. THE MILLER TRILOGY AND ENSUING REFORMS 
In the past, I have written extensively about the Miller trilogy cases, their meth-
odology, and their import.8 Here, I address them briefly only for purposes of con-
text. In 2005, the Supreme Court began to limit the states’ ability to impose on 
Berry III eds., 2020) (exploring how the Miller trilogy has impacted juvenile life without parole sentencing but 
not completely eliminated life and virtual life sentences for juveniles). In this Article, I am not focused on 
juvenile life without parole (“JLWOP”) or its equivalent, but rather the more routine—but no less devastating— 
instances when youth are subject to decade(s)-long sentences on a mandatory basis. 
4. See infra Part II. 
5. See Perry L. Moriearty, Miller v. Alabama and the Retroactivity of Proportionality Rules, 17 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 929, 949 (2015) (stating that, with the Roper decision, “[t]he Court’s modern ‘kids are different’ 
jurisprudence was born”). 
6. See infra Part III. 
7. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274 (2011) (holding that a child’s age is relevant to whether the 
child was “in custody” and therefore entitled to Miranda protections). 
8. See generally CARA H. DRINAN, THE WAR ON KIDS: HOW AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE LOST ITS WAY 84– 
96 (2017) (discussing Miller trilogy and subsequent promising legislative and judicial developments); Cara H. 
Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1787 (2016) [hereinafter Drinan, The Miller Revolution] 
(discussing revolutionary changes to juvenile justice policy that are possible post-Miller); Cara H. Drinan, 
Misconstruing Graham & Miller, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 785 (2014) (discussing how state actors have failed to 
comply with sentencing requirements imposed by the Graham and Miller rulings); Cara H. Drinan, Graham on 
the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51 (2012) (discussing implications of Graham for inmates as well as criminal 
justice reform more broadly). 
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children the harshest of criminal sentences. The Supreme Court held in Roper v. 
Simmons that the Constitution bars the execution of juveniles.9 The Roper Court 
examined youth as a group and analyzed whether execution of minors was propor-
tionate given their diminished culpability and greater capacity for rehabilitation.10 
At the same time, the Court looked at legislative trends regarding juvenile execu-
tion and exercised its own judgment to rule that the practice violated evolving 
standards of decency.11 Of particular import to the Roper Court was science that 
established children were categorically different from adults.12 This science proved 
that juveniles are lacking in maturity and impulse control; that they are more sus-
ceptible to negative peer influences than adults; and that their moral character is 
still fluid.13 And because of these developmental differences, the Court held that 
juveniles are less culpable than adults and that the goals of retribution and deter-
rence cannot justify the death penalty for minors.14 
Five years later, in Graham v. Florida, the Court embraced the same underlying 
science when examining the question of whether life without parole is a permissi-
ble sentence for a juvenile who commits a non-homicide crime.15 As the Court 
explained, the Eighth Amendment bars both “barbaric” punishments and punish-
ments that are disproportionate to the crime committed.16 Further, within the latter 
category of proportionality cases, the Court traditionally examined term-of-year 
sentences on a case-by-case basis, while in the death penalty context, it considered 
categorical restrictions.17 In a significant methodological departure,18 the Court 
held that, because Graham’s case challenged “a particular type of sentence” as 
applied “to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of crimes,” 
the Court should rely upon its (previously capital) categorical approach.19 Using 
this approach, and again relying upon the scientific differences between adoles-
cents and adults,20 the Graham Court held that the Constitution precludes a juve-
nile life-without-parole (“JLWOP”) sentence for a non-homicide crime.21   
9. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). 
10. Id. at 569–74. 
11. Id. at 574–75. 
12. See id. at 569–70. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 571–72, 575. 
15. 560 U.S. 48, 52–53 (2010). 
16. Id. at 59. 
17. Id. at 59–61. 
18. See, e.g., Alison Siegler & Barry Sullivan, “‘Death is Different’ No Longer”: Graham v. Florida and the 
Future of Eighth Amendment Challenges to Noncapital Sentences, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 327, 328 (noting that, 
previously, the Court had only considered categorical exclusions for death penalty cases). 
19. Graham, 560 U.S. at 61–62. 
20. Id. at 68 (“[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences 
between juvenile and adult minds.”). 
21. Id. at 74. 
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In 2012, in Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment bars JLWOP sentences even in most homicide cases.22 Specifically, 
JLWOP is not permissible unless the sentencing body takes into account “how 
children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sen-
tencing them to a lifetime in prison.”23 Sentencing bodies must analyze the minor’s 
developmental environment,24 and only if it is determined that the minor is “the 
rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,”25 is JLWOP 
constitutional.26 
Before addressing the work that remains to be done in terms of implementing 
the Miller trilogy, it is important to acknowledge the wave of reforms that this line 
of cases has set in motion over the last fifteen years. Based on the narrowest read-
ing of these cases, the Court outlawed juvenile execution, banned JLWOP in non- 
homicide cases, and significantly limited the instances in which states can impose 
JLWOP in homicide cases. In 2011, the year before Miller, only five states banned 
JLWOP,27 
CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR SENT’G OF YOUTH, RIGHTING WRONGS: THE FIVE-YEAR GROUNDSWELL OF STATE 
BANS ON LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILDREN 4 (2016), https://cfsy.org/wp-content/uploads/Righting- 
Wrongs-.pdf.  
whereas today twenty-four states and the District of Columbia ban the 
sentence.28 
States that Ban Life Without Parole, CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR SENT’G OF YOUTH (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www. 
fairsentencingofyouth.org/media-resources/states-that-ban-life/.  
Another six states have no one serving a JLWOP sentence.29 At the end 
of 2018, almost 400 individuals once sentenced to die in prison as children had 
returned to their homes and communities.30 
CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR SENT’G OF YOUTH, TIPPING POINT: A MAJORITY OF STATES ABANDON LIFE- 
WITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN 6 (2018), https://www.fairsentencingofyouth.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/Tipping-Point.pdf. But see Eli Hager, “Juvenile Lifers” Were Meant to Get a Second Chance. COVID- 
19 Could Get Them First., MARSHALL PROJECT (June 3, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/ 
2020/06/03/sentenced-to-life-as-teens-they-fear-getting-coronavirus-before-getting-a-second-chance (discussing 
the fact that nearly 1,000 “juvenile lifers” are still awaiting relief to which they are entitled per Miller). 
In addition to these successful imple-
mentation efforts, the logic and science of the Miller trilogy have generated a host 
of arguments regarding enhanced procedural safeguards for youth facing extreme 
sentences.31 Finally, there is growing consensus among the electorate in favor of 
rehabilitation for justice-involved youth, hopefully foreclosing the misguided 
22. 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).
23. Id. at 480; see also id. at 471–72 (reviewing the Roper and Graham discussions of why children are 
scientifically and constitutionally different). 
24. See id. at 477–80 (considering the circumstances in Miller’s case, including abuse and neglect). 
25. Id. at 479–80 (citation omitted). 
26. While not technically part of the Miller trilogy, it is important to note that in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 





31. See, e.g., David Siegel, What Hath Miller Wrought: Effective Representation of Juveniles in Capital- 
Equivalent Proceedings, 39 CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 363, 372 (2013) (arguing for heightened standard of 
representation for youth facing JLWOP); Sarah French Russell, Review for Release: Juvenile Offenders, State 
Parole Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89 IND. L.J. 373, 375–76 (2014) (reviewing state parole protocols 
and urging youth-specific reforms in light of Miller). 
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attitude of “adult time for adult crime.”32 
See, e.g., PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PUBLIC OPINION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA (2014), https://www. 
pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2015/08/pspp_juvenile_poll_web.pdf (finding that seventy-five percent of voters 
agree that treatment, counseling, and supervision are more important for juveniles than time in a corrections 
facility). 
These are all positive developments that 
one can trace back to the Supreme Court’s moral leadership in the Miller trilogy. 
However, as I discuss in the next two Parts, justice-involved youth in America 
are still routinely subject to harsh term-of-year sentences that do not take into 
account the mitigating aspects of youth, and courts can correct that. 
II. TRANSFER LAWS AND MANDATORY SENTENCING AS THE PERFECT STORM 
FOR KIDS 
Despite post-Miller reform efforts, youth in America are still subject to exces-
sively harsh criminal sentences. Here, I am focused not on the persistence of 
JLWOP, but on the more routine applications of adult criminal statutes to minors 
that result in disproportionate sentences.33 The Supreme Court has read the Eighth 
Amendment to bar not just sentences that are cruel because they are “barbaric,” 
but also sentences that are cruel because they are disproportionate.34 When consid-
ering whether a sentence is disproportionate to the crime committed, the Court has 
indicated a number of objective criteria that are relevant, including the “culpability 
of the offender.”35 Moreover, after the Miller trilogy, the Court has solidified the 
fact that children are categorically less culpable than adults based on developmen-
tal factors alone.36 Finally, the Court has made clear that its proportionality analy-
sis is not exclusively applicable to a certain kind of sentence, but rather applies to 
all punishments.37 
Accordingly, even outside the context of JLWOP, courts should be taking into 
account the diminished culpability of children. When they fail to do so, courts 
impose a disproportionate, and thus unconstitutional sentence, on a minor. In this 
Part, I explain that courts are routinely doing just that—imposing disproportionate 
sentences on minors—and often are doing so against their own judicial inclinations. 
This is because courts seem constrained by two related procedural elements that 
subject children to extreme sentences, each of which I discuss in turn below: trans-
fer laws that place children in adult court and mandatory sentencing schemes that 
apply once children are in the criminal court’s jurisdiction. 
32.  
33. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
34. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (“The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to the 
crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence.”). 
35. Id. at 292. 
36. See supra Part I. 
37. Solem, 463 U.S. at 288–89 (noting Eighth Amendment limitations apply to bail, fines, capital sentences, 
and felony prison sentences); id. at 290 (“[A] single day in prison may be unconstitutional in some 
circumstances.”). 
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A. Transfer Laws 
From the end of the nineteenth century, when the United States developed the 
juvenile court model, to the mid-twentieth century, children accused of a crime 
were dealt with in juvenile court.38 Removal from the juvenile court system was 
rare and difficult. But as the nation embraced tough-on-crime sentiments, state and 
federal lawmakers introduced “transfer laws,” which enabled a child to be 
removed from a juvenile court’s jurisdiction and tried in criminal court as if they 
were an adult. These transfer laws took on various forms: some defined by statute 
the charges that automatically triggered criminal court jurisdiction; others required 
a transfer hearing before a judge; and the most harmful ones granted prosecutors 
unfettered discretion to charge kids in adult court when they saw fit.39 
As of 2018, every state had some transfer provision that permitted a child to be 
tried, convicted, and sentenced in adult criminal court.40 
Id. at 21; see also OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PROVISIONS FOR 
IMPOSING ADULT SANCTIONS ON JUVENILE OFFENDERS (2018), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_ 
process/qa04115.asp?qaDate=2018.  
Most states have several 
such provisions.41 For example, in Florida, there are four mechanisms by which a 
child may be charged in adult criminal court: (1) a statutory provision that excludes 
certain minors from juvenile court based on age, the nature of the charges, and 
prior convictions; (2) discretionary transfer that permits the prosecutor to request 
transfer to adult court for any child age fourteen and older; (3) a provision that 
allows prosecutors to directly file a minor’s case in criminal court if the minor is 
age fourteen or older and has been charged with statutorily delineated crimes; and 
(4) a “Once an Adult, Always an Adult” provision that requires minors previously 
convicted in criminal court to thereafter be dealt with in adult court.42 
Florida State Profile, NAT’L. JUV. DEF. CTR., https://njdc.info/practice-policy-resources/state-profiles/ 
florida/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2021). 
In twenty- 
two states and the District of Columbia, there is at least one transfer provision that 
sets no minimum age requirement for transfer to adult court.43 
OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MINIMUM TRANSFER AGE 
SPECIFIED IN STATUTE (2018), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/qa04105.asp.  
These kind of laws 
are predicated on the legal fiction that, if a child is accused of a certain crime or 
has reached a certain stage of adolescence, that child is now an adult in the eyes of 
the law. 
Transfers laws inflict serious, lasting damage on justice-involved youth.44 To 
begin, juvenile court proceedings at least in theory are driven by pursuit of the 
child’s best interests. A child adjudicated in juvenile court may be offered rehabili-
tation or treatment, and, even if confined in a detention facility, they will be among 
38. See DRINAN, supra note 8, at 20–22, 52–56 (discussing history, nature, and dangers of juvenile transfer 
laws); Drinan, The Miller Revolution, supra note 8, at 1791 (same). 
39. See DRINAN, supra note 8, at 21–22. 
40. 
 
41. OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 40. 
42. 
43. 
44. See DRINAN, supra note 8, at 52–56. 
1664                            AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW                            [Vol. 58:1659 
other minors and have access to education. The same is not true in criminal court 
where the generally applicable criminal code applies, and the court is focused on 
issues of deterrence and retribution.45 Moreover, youth who are convicted and sen-
tenced in criminal court may end up incarcerated among adults. In 2019, over 
4,500 minors—nearly ten percent of all incarcerated youth—were being held in 
adult jails and prisons.46 
Wendy Sawyer, Youth Confinement: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Dec. 19, 2019), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/youth2019.html.  
Not only do youth in adult correctional settings miss out 
on age-appropriate education and vocational opportunities, but they are also at seri-
ous risk for physical and sexual assault, as well as suicide.47 Finally, studies show 
that transfer to adult criminal court actually increases the minor’s likelihood of 
future recidivism, perhaps in part because the adult criminal conviction hampers 
future life opportunities.48 
B. Mandatory Minimums 
Historically, judges in America have had the discretion to consider all relevant 
variables in a criminal case before imposing a sentence. However, as part of the 
war on drugs in the late-twentieth century, Congress and state lawmakers enacted 
mandatory sentencing statutes.49 
See FAM. AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS (“FAMM”), FAMM PRIMER ON MANDATORY SENTENCES 1– 
2, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/famm/Primer.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2021) (explaining the rise of 
mandatory minimums for drug crimes). 
These laws require judges to impose a legisla-
tively pre-determined punishment upon a convicted defendant without regard for 
the defendant’s personal attributes or mitigating circumstances of the crime. 
As scholars have documented widely, mandatory minimums are tremendously 
problematic in general.50 They have shifted power from judges to prosecutors, ena-
bling charge-bargaining and unfair plea deals.51 They have contributed to mass 
incarceration by requiring lengthy prison terms in cases where the defendant is not 
a threat to public safety.52 And they are unfair in perverse ways. For example, they 
simultaneously enable similar treatment of individuals with differing degrees of 
culpability and excessive punishment of low-level offenders while sparing more 
45. Id. at 53. 
46. 
47. Id. (“Adult prisons and jails are unquestionably the worst places for youth.”). 
48. DRINAN, supra note 8, at 54. 
49. 
50. See generally Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2010) 
(arguing for mandatory minimum reform through the observance of political minimalism); John S. Martin Jr., 
Why Mandatory Minimums Make No Sense, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 311 (2004) (offering a 
former U.S. District Court judge’s perspective on why mandatory minimum sentences should be abandoned); 
Mary Price, Mill(er)ing Mandatory Minimums: What Federal Lawmakers Should Take from Miller v. Alabama, 
78 MO. L. REV. 1147 (2013) (arguing for the reform and replacement of mandatory minimum sentencing with 
sentencing policies that embrace proportionality). 
51. Luna & Cassell, supra note 50, at 14–15; see also Cynthia Alkon, Hard Bargaining in Plea Bargaining: 
When Do Prosecutors Cross the Line?, 17 NEV. L.J. 401, 407 (2017). 
52. See Martin, Jr., supra note 50, at 314–16 (providing examples where a drug defendant may receive a 
longer sentence than “a racist who attacks a minority with the intent to kill” or “a terrorist who detonates a bomb 
in a public place”). 
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serious defendants.53 There is emerging consensus that any meaningful criminal 
justice reform in the twenty-first century will have to include repealing mandatory 
sentencing schemes. 
C. The Perfect Storm 
The interplay of these two mechanisms—transfer laws and mandatory 
minimums—is the perfect storm for justice-involved youth. Transfer laws make it 
relatively easy and common for youth to be charged in adult criminal court. Once 
in criminal court, kids are subject to mandatory minimums that were drafted with 
adults in mind and that many now recognize as unfair even as applied to adults. 
Some courts have recognized the inherent unfairness of this outcome in light of 
what the Supreme Court has said about juveniles’ diminished culpability and 
increased amenability to rehabilitation. Some courts have even invited legislative 
action.54 
And some states’ lawmakers have pursued legislative measures to address the 
science that says kids are different. For example, California lawmakers passed a 
law in 2018 to prevent the transfer of any child under the age of sixteen to adult 
criminal court.55 
Maureen Washburn, California’s Latest Adult Transfer Law Models Pathways for Reform for Rest of U.S., 
JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCH. (Oct. 3, 2018), https://jjie.org/2018/10/03/californias-latest-adult-transfer-law-models- 
pathways-for-reform-for-rest-of-u-s/.  
This was a measure designed to bolster an earlier ballot initiative 
that returned to judges the discretion as to whether such a transfer should happen at 
all.56 Similarly, Washington amended its mandatory sentencing provisions to 
exempt children tried as adults, noting that the “emerging research on brain devel-
opment indicates that adolescent brains, and thus adolescent intellectual and emo-
tional capabilities, differ significantly from those of mature adults.”57 In recent 
years, a number of states have raised the minimum age for transfer to adult court, 
and a few are attempting to extend juvenile court jurisdiction beyond the age of 
eighteen.58   
53. See FAMM, supra note 49, at 7–8 (discussing how, in a conspiracy prosecution, one is subject to the same 
mandatory minimum regardless of the role one played and that mitigation through information sharing is 
inherently only available to high-level drug traffickers). 
54. See, e.g., People v. Patterson, 25 N.E.3d 526, 553 (Ill. 2014) (“[W]e strongly urge the General Assembly 
to review the automatic transfer provision based on the current scientific and sociological evidence indicating a 




56. See M. Randell Scism, Children Are Different: The Need for Reform of Virginia’s Juvenile Transfer Laws, 
22 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 445, 460–61 (2019) (discussing California’s Proposition 57, the former ballot 
initiative). 
57. H.B. 11187, § 1, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005) (establishing the purpose for WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 9.94A.540 (2020)). 
58. Scism, supra note 56, at 462–64. 
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As I have written elsewhere, state legislative bodies can be a fruitful ground for 
aggressive juvenile justice reform.59 That said, they need not be the exclusive 
forum. 
III. THE CASE FOR STRIKING DOWN TRANSFER LAWS AND MANDATORY SENTENCING 
OF MINORS 
In this Part, I make the case that at least some transfer laws and mandatory mini-
mums as applied to youth are unconstitutional in light of the Miller trilogy. I 
address these mechanisms below in the order in which justice-involved youth en-
counter them. 
A. Transfer Laws 
Recall that, while every state has juvenile transfer laws, the laws vary in form.60 
For purposes of this Article, I am focused on those forms of transfer that eliminate 
judicial discretion, specifically statutory exclusion provisions and direct-file laws. 
As the name suggests, a statutory exclusion provision states that a child of a certain 
age accused of a certain crime is excluded from juvenile court and shall be within 
the jurisdiction of the adult court. Direct-file laws permit the prosecutor to charge 
the juvenile defendant in adult criminal court on a discretionary basis.61 Such laws 
should be barred in light of Miller. 
To begin, it is important to recognize that, historically, courts have been deferen-
tial in their review of juvenile transfer laws. In Kent v. United States, the U.S. 
Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the District of Columbia’s juve-
nile transfer provision satisfied the Constitution’s requirement of minimal due pro-
cess.62 The Court concluded that the relevant statute conferred significant latitude 
on juvenile court judges, but such “latitude [wa]s not complete.”63 The Court held 
that, as a matter of due process, juveniles like Kent were entitled to (1) a hearing 
before the juvenile court waived his case to adult-court jurisdiction, (2) access to 
the materials relevant to the court’s transfer decision, and (3) a written articulation 
of the reasons for the ultimate transfer decision.64 The Kent decision was friendly 
to juveniles in that it rejected the concept of absolute, unfettered judicial waiver to 
adult court, but it did not require very much of juvenile courts beyond the creation 
of a record. Moreover, the Kent decision did not address alternative transfer mech-
anisms, such as statutory exclusion and direct-file provisions that became common 
in the late-twentieth century. 
59. See Drinan, supra note 3, at 264–65. 
60. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
61. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, supra note 8, at 1793. 
62. 383 U.S. 541, 543 (1966). 
63. Id. at 552–53. 
64. Id. at 561–62. 
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In subsequent years, advocates challenged juvenile transfer laws on various 
grounds with little success. For example, in People v. J.S., the Illinois Supreme 
Court considered the constitutionality of a statute that required fifteen- and 
sixteen-year-old defendants charged with specific offenses to be tried in adult court.65 
The court upheld the statutory exclusion provision, rejecting claims that it violated 
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The court noted that classification 
based on age was not uncommon and was rationally related to the government’s legit-
imate state interest in prosecuting serious crimes.66 Moreover, the court held that the 
statute’s delineation of certain felonies as the basis for transfer to adult court was not 
arbitrary and thus did not violate due process. Instead, according to the court, the vio-
lent nature of the specified crimes and the frequency of their commission justified 
their inclusion (and not others) as a basis for transfer.67 
In the five decades since the Kent decision, many courts have come to similar 
conclusions when confronted with challenges to juvenile transfer provisions.68 I 
suggest, however, that in the wake of the Miller trilogy, courts should reconsider 
the constitutional legitimacy of direct-file and statutory-exclusion transfer laws. 
First, there is precedent for judicial constraint on juvenile transfer laws on which 
courts can build. Second, cases in which courts rejected constitutional challenges 
to transfer laws are now anachronistic in light of contemporary juvenile justice 
principles. They simply cannot coexist with the Supreme Court’s recent reliance 
upon the science of adolescent brain development. And finally, the Eighth 
Amendment provides courts an opportunity to reconsider the constitutionality of 
these laws. I develop each of these steps in greater detail below. 
1. Some Precedent for Successful Challenges to Juvenile Transfer Laws 
As discussed above, in the post-Kent years, courts entertained a number of con-
stitutional challenges to juvenile transfer laws, and in most cases, they upheld the 
laws. Juveniles transferred to adult court mounted challenges of three kinds: due 
process, equal protection, and separation of powers. Often litigants raised all three  
65. 469 N.E.2d 1090, 1092 (Ill. 1984). 
66. Id. at 1093–94. 
67. Id. at 1094–95. 
68. See, e.g., Manduley v. Superior Ct., 41 P.3d 3, 27 (Cal. 2002) (upholding prosecutorial discretion to file 
cases of minors in adult court against constitutional objections), superseded by statute, Public Safety and 
Rehabilitation Act of 2016, Prop. 57, § 4.2 (codified as amended at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (2019)); 
State v. Cain, 381 So. 2d 1361, 1367 (Fla. 1980) (upholding prosecutor’s right to direct file juvenile cases in adult 
court); People v. Thorpe, 641 P.2d 935, 939–40 (Colo. 1982) (upholding direct-file provision against due process 
and equal protection challenges); State v. Aalim, 83 N.E.3d 883, 887 (Ohio 2017) (upholding statutory-exclusion 
law against constitutional challenge); State v. Perique, 439 So. 2d 1060, 1064–65 (La. 1983) (upholding 
statutory-exclusion law against as-applied constitutional challenge); State v. Leach, 425 So. 2d 1232, 1235–37 
(La. 1983) (upholding statutory-exclusion law against facial constitutional challenge); Bishop v. State, 462 S. 
E.2d 716, 718–19 (Ga. 1995) (upholding prosecutorial discretion in juvenile transfer). 
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objections. They also routinely failed in these claims. For example, in Bishop v. 
State,69 the state’s attorney exercised discretion to keep a fourteen-year-old in 
Georgia’s adult court system. The juvenile defendant argued that the prosecution’s 
power to select the forum for the case was, in fact, a legislative function. The court 
roundly rejected this, as others have done, explaining that: “This discretionary 
choice of forums afforded the district attorney is simply a consequence of the exer-
cise by the General Assembly of the power delegated to it by the Constitution.”70 
Further, the court swiftly rejected an equal protection challenge to the transfer pro-
vision, noting that “treatment as a juvenile is not an inherent right.”71 Thus, the 
legislature only needed to offer a rational basis for its classification of which juve-
niles would be charged in adult court, which it had done.72 In the absence of any 
evidence of prosecutorial arbitrariness or discrimination, the court upheld the pro-
vision.73 The Bishop court is representative of many other courts during the latter 
half of the twentieth century that afforded great discretion first to the legislature 
that drafted transfer laws and then to the prosecutors implementing them.74 
And yet there were exceptions where courts identified constitutional defects in 
juvenile transfer laws. In 1972, the Tenth Circuit struck down Oklahoma’s statu-
tory cutoff for juvenile court on equal protection grounds.75 The Oklahoma law at 
issue stated that a “child” eligible for juvenile court was defined as “any male per-
son under the age of sixteen (16) years and any female person under the age of 
eighteen (18) years.”76 The Oklahoma Supreme Court had upheld the statute, 
defending the distinction: “‘As we view the situation, the statute exemplifies the 
legislative judgment of the Oklahoma State Legislature, premised upon the demon-
strated facts of life; and we refuse to interfere with that judgment.’”77 The Tenth 
Circuit found this justification insufficient: “‘Demonstrated facts of life’ could 
mean many things. The ‘demonstrated facts’ which the Court relied upon are not 
spelled out.”78 Without an articulation of those facts, the statute could have been 
based on entirely arbitrary criteria, and it was thus unconstitutional. 
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court struck down the state’s direct-file trans-
fer provision on state constitutional grounds.79 The statute at issue in State v. Mohi 
permitted the prosecutor to directly file the cases of sixteen- and seventeen-year- 
olds accused of capital or first-degree felonies in adult court based on pure 
69. 462 S.E.2d 716. 
70. Id. at 717. 
71. Id. at 718. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 719. 
74. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
75. Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18, 20 (10th Cir. 1972); see also Kelley v. Kaiser, 992 F.2d 1509, 1515 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (finding Oklahoma transfer provisions that distinguished based on gender unconstitutional). 
76. Lamb, 456 F.2d at 19. 
77. Id. (quoting Lamb v. State, 475 P.2d 829, 830 (Okla. 1970)). 
78. Id. at 20. 
79. State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 997 (Utah 1995). 
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discretion.80 The state supreme court held that the statute violated the state’s 
Uniform Operation of Laws provision81—a provision akin to the Equal Protection 
Clause—because it enabled prosecutors to treat similarly situated individuals dif-
ferently without offering any justification for the differential treatment.82 One 
sixteen-year-old charged with a first-degree felony may be charged in adult court, 
while another child of the same age, facing the same charge, would be adjudicated in 
juvenile court—and the law required no explanation from the state for these wildly 
different outcomes. 
In sum, most courts during the last half-century have upheld state transfer laws 
in the face of constitutional challenges, giving lawmakers wide latitude, including 
the flexibility to delegate transfer decisions to prosecutors. But there have been no-
table exceptions.83 And therefore courts striking down transfer laws today would 
not be the first to do so. 
2. The Majority Approach Is Outdated 
Second, even if one recognizes that the majority of courts have upheld transfer 
laws in the past, when one reads those opinions today, they appear anachronistic 
and inappropriate in light of current science regarding adolescence. Recall from 
Part I, supra, that this science has informed the Supreme Court’s recent juvenile 
sentencing decisions, and it identifies key features of adolescence that are of con-
stitutional significance when analyzing punishment. That science tells us that the 
adolescent brain is still developing into the mid-twenties.84 It tells us that, because 
of immature brain development, youth are risk-seeking, subject to peer pressure, 
less capable of weighing long-term consequences against short-term rewards, and 
impulsive.85 And the Supreme Court has relied upon that science to hold that youth 
are categorically less culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation.86 
Yet the majority of cases upholding state transfer laws were decided long before 
that science was established and certainly before the Supreme Court relied upon it. 
As a result, the language of these earlier cases is dissonant in the wake of Miller. 
For example, in 1977, the Fifth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of Florida’s 
transfer law, a provision which permitted removal from juvenile court upon a 
grand jury indictment for a crime punishable by life imprisonment or death.87 The 
80. See id. 
81. See UTAH CONST. art. I, § 24 (“All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.”). 
82. Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1004. 
83. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241, 250 (Del. 1994) (finding statute transferring child who turns 
eighteen while facing charges to adult court without judicial oversight violative of state and federal 
constitutions). 
84. Barry C. Feld, Competence and Culpability: Delinquents in Juvenile Courts, Youths in Criminal Courts, 
102 MINN. L. REV. 473, 557 (2017). 
85. See generally id. at 555–61 (discussing neuroscience, developmental psychology, and their relationship to 
adolescent culpability). 
86. See supra Part I. 
87. Woodward v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 787 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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petitioners challenged this provision in the wake of Kent v. United States,88 arguing 
that deprivation of juvenile court treatment should have been the subject of a hear-
ing with procedural safeguards. The federal court rejected this claim, in part by dis-
tinguishing Kent on statutory grounds, but also by noting that “treatment as a 
juvenile is not an inherent right but one granted by the state legislature. . . .”89 The 
court further opined: 
Doubtless the Florida legislature considered carefully the rise in the number 
of crimes committed by juveniles as well as the growing recidivist rate among 
this group. The legislature was entitled to conclude that the parens patriae 
function of the juvenile system would not work for certain juveniles, or that 
society demanded greater protection from these offenders than that provided 
by that system. We should not second-guess this conclusion.90 
This language is consistent with the dominant narrative about juvenile crime in 
the late-twentieth century.91 
These cases are jarring to read today because they refuse to recognize several ju-
venile justice principles that are now foundational. Children enjoy many different 
kinds of rights: Youth have the right to be cared for in basic respects until the age 
of majority;92 the rights of speech and expression in school;93 the right to bodily 
autonomy;94 the right to express an opinion regarding custodial arrangements;95 
recognized most recently, the right to be sentenced in an age-appropriate way;96 
and the right to a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” in the correctional 
context.97 Given the robust development of children’s rights, it is absurd to assert 
that, while juveniles have many rights, being treated as a juvenile is not one of 
those rights. Moreover, the factual predicates for many of the transfer laws that 
were upheld in the late-twentieth century have been belied or debunked. We know 
now, for example, that the juvenile super-predator theory was plainly wrong and 
88. 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (holding that juvenile was entitled to hearing, among other safeguards, before 
juvenile court could waive jurisdiction). 
89. Woodward, 556 F.2d at 785 (emphasis added). 
90. Id. 
91. See Feld, supra note 84, at 477–79 (outlining the “harsh legacy of the 1980s’ and 1990s’ get-tough 
policies” regarding juvenile justice). 
92. See Steven Mintz, Placing Children’s Rights in Historical Perspective, 44 CRIM. L. BULL. 313, 313 
(2008) (describing “protective” children’s rights, which include a “right to a stable home, adequate subsistence, 
and an education”). 
93. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (upholding child’s right to 
wear armband in school as right of free expression). 
94. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (rejecting blanket rule requiring 
parental consent for abortion because “[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only 
when one attains the state-defined age of majority”). 
95. See Sarah J. Baldwin, Choosing a Home: When Should Children Make Autonomous Choices About Their 
Home Life?, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 503, 514–15 (2013) (surveying how states handle children’s input with 
regard to custody arrangements). 
96. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012). 
97. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010). 
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that juvenile crime plummeted at the end of the twentieth century.98 
See Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Superpredator’ Fear, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/killing-on-bus-recalls-superpredator-threat-of-90s.html.  
We also 
know that most youth simply “age out” of crime.99 
See Dana Goldstein, Too Old to Commit Crime?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www. 
themarshallproject.org/2015/03/20/too-old-to-commit-crime (considering neuroscience and statistical studies 
that support that criminal propensity declines after a certain age). 
To the extent that courts 
were deferential to legislative judgment of facts on the ground, those facts no 
longer govern. And finally, science has shown, and courts now accept, that it is 
impossible to predict at the sentencing (let alone charging) phase whether youth-
ful crime reflects “unfortunate yet transient immaturity” or the rare case of 
“irreparable corruption.”100  As a result, courts should not casually defer to the 
legislative judgment that some children, by stage of adolescence or nature of the 
crime charged, are beyond the rehabilitative capacities of the juvenile system. 
This conclusion simply cannot be known a priori. 
In sum, while the majority of courts have upheld juvenile transfer laws in the 
past, those majority opinions relied upon outdated and now irrelevant notions of 
adolescents, their development, and their criminal inclinations. 
3. New Challenge Rooted in the Eighth Amendment 
Even if one accepts those prior cases as settled law, in the wake of Miller, there 
is a new avenue for challenging transfer laws: The Eighth Amendment. The 
Supreme Court has relied on the Eighth Amendment to adopt categorical bans on 
sentencing practices based on the mismatch between the culpability of juvenile 
offenders and the severity of certain penalties. Here, I argue that the Eighth 
Amendment provides additional protection from mismatched sentences, specifi-
cally when a juvenile is exposed to the harms of adult criminal court by legislative 
fiat. 
Before getting to the heart of this argument, there is a preliminary issue that 
must be addressed. The Eighth Amendment bars “cruel and unusual punish-
ments.”101 Some courts have found transfer laws immune to Eighth Amendment 
scrutiny because they treat these laws as “procedural” rather than “punitive” in na-
ture.102 This argument, however, suffers from formalistic and overly simplistic rea-
soning. While it is true that a transfer law addresses jurisdiction and not an 
ultimate sentence, it would strain any commonsense use of the term “punishment”  
98. 
99. 
100. Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80 (citing and discussing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005), and 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 68); see also Mary Marshall, Miller v. Alabama and the Problem of Prediction, 119 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1633, 1636 (2019) (arguing that prediction is “fundamentally impossible”). 
101. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
102. See, e.g., People v. Patterson, 25 N.E.3d 526, 551 (Ill. 2014) (“[I]n the absence of actual punishment 
imposed by the transfer statute, defendant’s eighth amendment challenge cannot stand.”); People v. Harmon, 26 
N.E.3d 344, 359 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (holding that automatic transfer statute does not impose punishment but only 
specifies forum for adjudication and thus the Eighth Amendment does not apply). 
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to frame transfer to adult court as non-punitive.103 As discussed in Section II.A, su-
pra, from the outset, transfer to adult court alters the lens of analysis from rehabili-
tation to retribution, and it eliminates rehabilitative outcomes only available in 
juvenile court. Moreover, the social science evidence indicates that minors are not 
equipped to navigate the adversarial process of criminal court, and they suffer 
when they attempt to do so.104 Most significant, juvenile delinquency proceedings 
are civil in nature, whereas criminal court proceedings are just that: criminal in na-
ture. The latter are adversarial and stigmatizing even in the rare case where they do 
not result in punishment. Transfer laws devoid of judicial oversight are the keys 
that unlock the door to adult punishment and all of its devastating consequences, 
including harsh, non-rehabilitative sentences and lifelong collateral consequen-
ces.105 
See, e.g., MARGARET LOVE & DAVID SCHLUSSEL, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., THE MANY 
ROADS TO REINTEGRATION (Sept. 2020), https://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/The-Many- 
Roads-to-Reintegration.pdf (compiling a fifty-state survey of collateral consequences to arrest and conviction). 
To label such a transfer process “procedural” rather than “punitive” is pure 
sophistry,106 and courts should not shy away from reaching an Eighth Amendment 
challenge to transfer laws on these grounds. 
The Eighth Amendment argument against juvenile transfer laws that are devoid 
of judicial discretion is fairly straightforward.107 In the Miller trilogy, the Court 
articulated several findings regarding children. First, “children are constitutionally 
different from adults for sentencing purposes.”108 Second, because of these signifi-
cant differences, traditional punishment rationales do not have the same moral 
force as applied to children. Retribution is undermined by the fact that children are 
inherently less culpable; deterrence is less effective because of children’s immatur-
ity; and incapacitation is inappropriate because “incorrigibility is inconsistent with 
youth.”109 While Miller was focused on the specific sentence of JLWOP, the Court 
103. Cf. Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241, 250 (Del. 1994) (discussing “criminal prosecution” in adult court and 
its “grave attendant consequences” (emphasis added)). 
104. See Feld, supra note 84, at 501–31 (examining issues with the current system of juvenile courts and 
youths tried in criminal courts, given competency and psychological issues). 
105. 
 
106. See Patterson, 25 N.E.3d at 557 (Theis, J., dissenting) (“[T]hat approach is overly simplistic, and 
elevates form over substance. The automatic transfer statute may indeed protect the public, but it does so by 
mandatorily placing juveniles in criminal court based only on their offenses, and thereby exposing them to vastly 
higher adult sentences and, in effect, punishing them.”); id. at 557–60 (reviewing legislative history that 
indicated the purpose of the transfer law was to punish juveniles). 
107. A few scholars have explored this issue in prior works. See, e.g., Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida 
to Challenge Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L. REV. 99 (2010) (encouraging lawyers to revisit prior challenges 
to transfer statutes based on Graham); Janet C. Hoeffel, The Jurisprudence of Death And Youth: Now the Twain 
Should Meet, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 29, 51–55 (2013) (arguing that Miller calls into question juvenile transfer 
laws); Wendy N. Hess, Kids Can Change: Reforming South Dakota’s Juvenile Transfer Law to Rehabilitate 
Children and Protect Public Safety, 59 S.D. L. REV. 312 (2014) (arguing for state-specific transfer law reform in 
wake of Supreme Court’s recent juvenile sentencing decisions); Scism, supra note 56 (same); Beck Roan, 
Ignoring Individualism, How a Disregard for Neuroscience and Supreme Court Precedent Makes for Bad Policy 
in Idaho’s Mandatory Juvenile Transfer Law, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 719 (2016) (same). I first made this argument in 
The Miller Revolution. Drinan, supra note 8, at 1825–26. 
108. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012). 
109. Id. at 472–73 (citation omitted). 
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acknowledged that “none of what [Graham] said about children—about their 
distinctive (and transitory) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is 
crime-specific.”110 And I would urge here, that none of what the Court has said 
about children is punishment-specific. 
Thus, after Miller, courts may find juvenile transfer laws that are lacking judicial 
discretion to be in violation of the Eighth Amendment. To begin, advocates can 
argue that, just like in Graham, “a sentencing practice itself is in question,” and 
thus the Supreme Court’s categorical approach from Graham is also appropriate.111 
The first step of the categorical approach is to examine “objective indicia of 
national consensus.”112 While it is true, as discussed in Section II.A, supra, that ev-
ery state has some kind of law that permits children to be tried as adults, there are 
still outlier transfer practices among the states. These outlier practices—extreme 
versions of transfer in a minority of states—are ripe for Eighth Amendment scru-
tiny. For example, among the forty-six states where a juvenile matter begins in ju-
venile court, there is mandatory waiver to adult court in only twelve states.113 
OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUVENILES TRIED AS ADULTS 
(2018), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/qa04115.asp?qaDate=2018.  
This 
means that, in those twelve states, a statute requires the juvenile court judge to 
waive jurisdiction and transfer the case to adult court once certain criteria are 
met.114 Similarly, the prosecutor has the power to bring charges against a minor 
directly in criminal court in only fourteen states.115 In sum, even though juvenile 
transfer laws are ubiquitous in the United States, the objective indicia of commu-
nity consensus are against those forms of transfer law that deprive the judiciary of 
any modicum of discretion. 
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s categorical approach, after considering 
community consensus, courts examining extreme versions of transfer that strip 
judges of discretion should also exercise their own judgment about such prac-
tices.116 As the Graham Court explained: “The judicial exercise of independent 
judgment requires consideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue in light 
of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in 
question . . . [and] whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate pe-
nological goals.”117 In doing so, courts should consider not only the documented 
110. Id. at 473. 
111. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010) (“This case implicates a particular type of sentence as it 
applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of crimes.”). 
112. Id. at 62. 
113. 
114. Id. (defining “mandatory waiver” as when “statutes specify when the matter must be transferred . . . after 
verifying certain conditions are met”). 
115. Id.; see also Jennifer S. Breen & John R. Mills, Mandating Discretion: Juvenile Sentencing Schemes 
After Miller v. Alabama, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 293, 311 (2015) (identifying outlier forms of transfer provisions 
under which “[t]he crime with which the child is charged is entirely and exclusively dispositive of how the child 
will be sentenced and processed in the criminal justice system”). 
116. Graham, 560 U.S. at 67 (“In accordance with the constitutional design, ‘the task of interpreting the 
Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility.’” (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005))). 
117. Id. (citations omitted). 
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differences between adults and minors as reflected in the Miller trilogy,118 but also 
the voluminous evidence regarding the harms of transfer laws. For example, in 
2007, the Centers for Disease Control released a report on the effects of juvenile 
transfer to adult court and documented significant negative outcomes. Finding that 
youth tried as adults are thirty-four percent more likely to commit crimes than 
youth kept in the juvenile system, the report concluded that “transferring juveniles 
to the adult system is counterproductive as a strategy for preventing or reducing vi-
olence.”119 
ROBERT HAN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, EFFECTS ON VIOLENCE OF LAWS AND POLICIES 
FACILITATING THE TRANSFER OF YOUTH FROM THE JUVENILE TO THE ADULT JUSTICE SYSTEM (Nov. 30, 2007), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5609a1.htm.  
In 2012, the Department of Justice similarly released a report detailing 
the harms associated with transferring children to adult court, noting that such 
youth receive longer sentences and miss out on crucial adolescent developmental 
opportunities.120 
EDWARD P. MULVEY & CAROL A. SCHUBERT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., TRANSFER OF JUVENILES TO ADULT 
COURT: EFFECTS OF A BROAD POLICY IN ONE COURT 3–5 (Dec. 2012), https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/ 
xyckuh176/files/pubs/232932.pdf.  
Most disturbing, the report discussed the ways in which youth in 
adult settings are likely to be victims of sexual assault, physical assault, or both. 
According to one study mentioned in the report, even though youth make up only a 
small portion of prisoners in adult facilities, “21 percent of all victims of substanti-
ated incidents of inmate-on-inmate sexual violence in jails were juveniles younger 
than age 18.”121 This is consistent with other findings regarding juvenile vulner-
ability to physical and sexual assault in adult prisons.122 The report noted that 
many researchers in the area have concluded that transfer laws do more social 
harm than good.123 In sum, a court exercising its own independent judgment 
regarding a narrow subset of transfer laws devoid of judicial discretion could read-
ily determine that such laws are fundamentally unfair and irrational—that they do 
not “serve legitimate penological goals” given their severity and likelihood of 
inflicting harm.124 
In recent years, state courts have engaged with renewed challenges to juvenile 
transfer laws—challenges that leverage the logic of the Miller trilogy—and these 
cases reveal an uncertain area of the law. For example, in 2014, the Illinois 
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the state’s automatic transfer 
law. In People v. Patterson, the fifteen-year-old defendant was charged with aggra-
vated sexual assault and automatically transferred to adult court, where he was 
convicted and sentenced to more than thirty years in prison.125 On appeal before 
the state supreme court, the defendant challenged the state’s automatic transfer 
118. See supra Part I. 
119. 
120. 
121. Id. at 4. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 6 (“Studies like these have contributed to the conclusion that juvenile transfer policies uniformly 
produce negative outcomes.”). 
124. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010). 
125. People v. Patterson, 25 N.E.3d 526, 530 (Ill. 2014). 
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statute in light of the Miller trilogy. Based largely on the way in which the defend-
ant framed the arguments,126 the court rejected his claims and upheld the transfer 
law. Nonetheless, the court conceded the following: 
We do, however, share the concern expressed in both the Supreme Court’s 
recent case law and the dissent in this case over the absence of any judicial 
discretion in Illinois’s automatic transfer provision. While modern research 
has recognized the effect that the unique qualities and characteristics of youth 
may have on juveniles’ judgment and actions, the automatic transfer provision 
does not. Indeed, the mandatory nature of that statute denies this reality.127 
Similarly, in 2015, the Connecticut Supreme Court considered a defendant’s 
Eighth Amendment challenge to a fifteen-year mandatory sentence imposed by the 
criminal court for crimes that began when he was fourteen years old.128 While the 
majority rejected the defendant’s challenge by distinguishing the fifteen-year sen-
tence from the extreme sentences at issue in the Miller trilogy,129 the concurring 
and dissenting opinions demonstrated sympathy for the defendant’s claims. 
Concurring in the opinion, Justice Palmer wrote extensively on the relevance of 
the Miller trilogy to defendant’s case and invited the legislature “to revisit the 
question of whether such mandatory prison terms are appropriate for juveniles, as 
a matter of sound public policy, in light of the marked differences between juve-
niles and adults.”130 Moreover, the dissenting justice not only agreed with the de-
fendant on the merits, but also specifically noted the manner in which the state’s 
automatic transfer statute contributed to his unconstitutional sentence: 
The mandatory transfer statute automatically transferring the defendant from 
juvenile court—where the court had no sentencing floor—to adult court— 
where a sentencing floor of ten years of incarceration was automatically 
imposed without regard to the defendant’s individual characteristics—raised 
the floor of the sentencing range and “require[d] the judge to impose a higher 
punishment than he might wish.” This violates the mandates of the United  
126. For example, the defendant urged the court to reconsider its due process rulings regarding the juvenile 
transfer law pursuant to the Miller trilogy, and the court refused to do so noting that: 
[D]efendant is attempting to support his due process argument by relying on the Supreme Court’s 
eighth amendment analysis in Roper, Graham, and Miller. . . . Although both the Supreme Court 
and defendant have emphasized the distinctive nature of juveniles, the applicable constitutional 
standards differ considerably between due process and eighth amendment analyses.  
Id. at 549. 
127. Id. at 553 (internal citations omitted). See also id. at 556–69 (Theis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Illinois automatic transfer statute violates the Eighth Amendment per Miller and the parallel portion of the state 
constitution). 
128. State v. Taylor G., 110 A.3d 338, 341–42 (Conn. 2015). 
129. Id. at 344–46. 
130. Id. at 361 (Palmer, J., concurring). 
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States Supreme Court’s juvenile sentencing jurisprudence of Roper, Graham, 
and Miller.131 
Most recently, litigation before the Ohio Supreme Court centered on the constitu-
tionality of a mandatory transfer law.132 In 2016, the state supreme court struck 
down the transfer statute that automatically subjected certain minors to criminal 
court jurisdiction based on age and the offenses charged. Discussing both the 
Miller trilogy and state constitutional provisions, the court found the transfer law 
to be in violation of due process as guaranteed by the Ohio state constitution.133 As 
the majority explained: 
The mandatory-transfer statutes preclude a juvenile-court judge from taking 
any individual circumstances into account before automatically sending a 
child who is 16 or older to adult court. This one-size-fits-all approach runs 
counter to the aims and goals of the juvenile system, and even those who 
would be amenable to the juvenile system are sent to adult court. Juvenile- 
court judges must be allowed the discretion that the General Assembly 
permits for other children. They should be able to distinguish between those 
children who should be treated as adults and those who should not.134 
One year later, on the state’s motion for reconsideration, the Ohio Supreme 
Court vacated its earlier decision and held that the mandatory transfer provision 
did not, in fact, violate the federal or state constitutions.135 In a highly fragmented 
decision, the court revisited the legal questions and held that the history of juvenile 
law in Ohio could not support a substantive due process, a procedural due process, 
or an equal protection challenge to the statute in question.136 In separate dissenting 
opinions, though, two justices documented their dismay with the court’s failure to 
protect minors from “mandatory transfer” that “implicates the punitive aspect of 
sentencing and deprives the juvenile of access to the rehabilitative hallmarks of the 
juvenile-justice system.”137 The chief justice wrote in dissent that, under funda-
mental fairness and procedural due process analysis, juveniles should be entitled to 
an amenability hearing before removal from the juvenile court system.138 Echoing 
the sentiments of the chief justice, the second dissenting justice wrote even more 
explicitly that the reconsidered decision was merely a function of politics:  
131. Id. at 378 (Eveleigh, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
132. State v. Aalim, 83 N.E.3d 862, 864 (Ohio 2016), vacated by State v. Aalim, 83 N.E.3d 883 (Ohio 2017). 
133. Id. at 868–70. 
134. Id. at 870. 
135. State v. Aalim, 83 N.E.3d 883, 887 (Ohio 2017). 
136. Id. at 890–96. The court also noted that it had failed in its original review of the case “to consider the General 
Assembly’s exclusive constitutional authority to define the jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas . . . .” Id. at 
896.  
137. Id. at 903 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting). 
138. Id. at 905–13. 
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“[T]here is nothing new to reconsider here; the only thing that has changed is the 
makeup of this court as a result of the 2016 election.”139 
While none of these cases were a clear victory for juvenile justice advocates 
challenging mandatory transfer laws under Miller, they nonetheless provide 
grounds for optimism. These opinions reveal that this area of the law is anything 
but settled. Moreover, the discord among judges in these decisions drives home the 
fact that “[i]n the context of juvenile transfer to adult court, the Supreme Court has 
remained silent since Kent,” and in doing so has created “confusion as to what 
authority state legislatures have to enact mandatory-transfer statutes with limited 
or no process.”140 Given the body of Eighth Amendment law that the U.S. 
Supreme Court has developed in the last fifteen years insisting that youth must be 
considered at sentencing, these recent cases only highlight the fact that juvenile 
transfer laws are ripe for constitutional challenge today. 
B. Mandatory Minimums as Applied to Youth 
Juvenile transfer laws and mandatory minimums together create the perfect 
storm for justice-involved youth. Automatic transfer laws place children in adult 
court without judicial oversight, and once children are charged in adult court, they 
are subject to mandatory minimums that were drafted with adults in mind. Just as 
the Miller trilogy renders automatic transfer laws unlawful, so too does it under-
mine the legitimacy of mandatory minimums as applied to youth. I have made this 
claim before,141 and here I will only recap it briefly before discussing recent litiga-
tion in this area. Simply put, one cannot square mandatory sentencing of juveniles 
with either the language or the logic of the Miller trilogy. In Miller, the Court 
explained that “[m]andatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes considera-
tion of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, 
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.”142 And while skep-
tics of my claim note that the Court was specifically addressing JLWOP sentences, 
in an earlier part of the decision, the Miller Court acknowledged that “none of 
what [Graham] said about children—about their distinctive (and transitory) mental 
traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime-specific.”143 And in the same 
way, none of what the Court has said about children’s diminished culpability is 
sentence-specific either. Children are still immature, impetuous, risk-seeking, and 
subject to peer pressure whether they are facing a death-in-custody sentence or a 
mandatory sentence of fifteen years. Moreover, the Miller Court drew on two 
strands of precedent to arrive at its decision: its line of cases dealing with categori-
cal bans on certain sentences and its line of cases barring mandatory imposition of 
139. Id. at 914 (O’Neill, J., dissenting). 
140. Id. 
141. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, supra note 8, at 1819–24. 
142. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 (2012). 
143. Id. at 473. 
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the death penalty.144 Together, these two lines of cases led the Court to conclude 
that children are categorically different from adults for sentencing purposes 
and that those differences should be examined in an individualized, granular man-
ner. Thus, in the wake of Miller, mandatory minimum sentencing schemes— 
schemes that preclude consideration of youth and its mitigating attributes—cannot 
apply to minors. 
To date, only one state supreme court has taken this position. In State v. Lyle, 
the Iowa Supreme Court declared mandatory minimums as applied to youth uncon-
stitutional under its state constitution.145 In an expansive opinion, the Lyle court 
canvassed the history of juvenile justice in America, as well as the Supreme 
Court’s recent bans on extreme juvenile sentencing in the Miller trilogy.146 The 
Lyle court concluded: 
Miller is properly read to support a new sentencing framework that recon-
siders mandatory sentencing for all children. Mandatory minimum sentencing 
results in cruel and unusual punishment due to the differences between chil-
dren and adults. This rationale applies to all crimes, and no principled basis 
exists to cabin the protection only for the most serious crimes.147 
The Lyle court correctly focused on the fact that the lynchpin of the Miller trilogy 
was the defining characteristics of children that render them less culpable. Those 
defining characteristics do not vary with the charges or the penalty that children 
face, and to the extent that those characteristics demand individual assessment, 
that must be true in all sentencing contexts. 
Courts that have upheld mandatory minimums in the face of a Miller-based chal-
lenge have relied on a mistakenly narrow reading of the Miller trilogy, finding 
Miller only applicable to JLWOP cases. For example, an Arizona appellate court 
determined, “Miller stated only that ‘a judge or jury must have the opportunity to 
consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty 
for juveniles.’”148 The court elaborated that this defendant “did not receive the 
harshest penalty. Instead, the trial court imposed a sentence of life without the pos-
sibility of release for twenty-five years.”149 That court held that “the requirement 
for ‘individualized sentencing’ was based on the [Miller] Court’s determination 
that natural-life prison terms for juveniles are analogous to capital punishment for 
adults,”150 and thus Miller did not preclude other mandatory minimum sentences 
for minors. While it is true that the Miller Court viewed JLWOP as analogous to a 
144. Id. at 470. 
145. State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 380 (Iowa 2014). 
146. Id. at 390–95. 
147. Id. at 402. 
148. State v. Imel, No. 2 CA-CR 2015-0112, 2015 WL 7373800, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2015) 
(citation omitted). 
149. Id. 
150. Id.; see also People v. Wilson, 62 N.E.3d 329, 337, 340 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (limiting Miller’s application 
to cases of mandatory JLWOP). 
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death sentence for an adult, the Court’s decision relied upon two separate lines of 
precedent, not solely the precedent that bars mandatory imposition of the death 
penalty. As discussed above, the Court drew first upon its line of cases that have 
categorically rejected certain kinds of sentences for certain classes of individu-
als.151 And in further developing that line of cases, the Court cemented its “kids- 
are-different” jurisprudence and rejected an entire category of sentence for youth 
based on their diminished culpability and capacity for rehabilitation.152 Lower 
courts are not free to ignore that co-equal part of the Court’s rationale so as to con-
fine the Miller decision to the JLWOP arena. 
Other courts that reject Miller-based challenges to mandatory minimums fail to 
recognize the interplay of transfer laws and mandatory minimum laws, as 
described supra in Part II. For example, in State v. Taylor G., the Supreme Court 
of Connecticut rejected the defendant’s challenge to his mandatory minimum sen-
tence of fifteen years for a sexual assault conviction.153 At sentencing, the trial 
court itself expressed hesitation about the mandatory minimum sentence given the 
young age of the defendant and the fact that he had experienced childhood abuse. 
Further, the trial court noted that lawmakers were not contemplating fourteen- 
year-old defendants when they enacted the mandatory minimums. Nonetheless, 
bound by governing law, the trial court gave the defendant what it described as the 
most “lenient [sentence it] possibly c[ould].”154 
On appeal, the defendant challenged his mandatory minimum sentence as dis-
proportionate and unlawful post-Miller. As most courts do, the high court in 
Connecticut myopically viewed the Miller line of cases as only applicable to the 
“two most severe punishments courts are able to impose.”155 As discussed above, 
the Miller trilogy was equally focused on severity of sentences and the distinguish-
ing and mitigating qualities of youth. More disturbing, though, is the fact that the 
Connecticut Supreme Court defended the mandatory minimums as applied to a 
fourteen-year-old based on the rationale that the sentencing court did have some 
discretion: it could have imposed the maximum applicable sentence of fifty-five 
years, but, instead, it applied the statutory minimum.156 Further, the court noted, 
“[a] mandatory minimum sentence is, by definition, the least punitive sentence that 
may be imposed under a sentencing statute.”157 The court concluded that, given the 
151. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012). 
152. See id. (holding mandatory JLWOP unconstitutional); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) 
(holding JLWOP for non-homicidal offenses unconstitutional). 
153. 110 A.3d 338, 341–42 (Conn. 2015). The defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting his cousin 
beginning when he was fourteen years old and continuing until he was fifteen years old. The conviction carried a 
mandatory minimum of ten years for the sexual assault conviction and five years for a related risk of injury to a 
child conviction. Id. at 341–42. 
154. Id. at 343–44. 
155. Id. at 346. 
156. Id. at 347. 
157. Id. 
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nature of the conviction, the mandatory minimum was not disproportionate for 
Eighth Amendment purposes. 
But the court ignored what the trial court had noted—that the mandatory mini-
mums were not drafted with fourteen-year-olds in mind. And in Taylor G.’s case, 
the mandatory minimum was only applicable to him because of the state’s auto-
matic transfer provision. Under the state’s statutory exclusion law, any minor 
charged with committing a Class A or B felony after the age of fourteen was auto-
matically removed from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to the regular criminal 
docket.158 Once in adult court, it is true that the “least punitive sentence” for 
Taylor G. was fifteen years. However, in juvenile court, Taylor G. would have ben-
efited from the fact that “the dispositional goal of the Juvenile Court is treatment 
more than punishment”;159 
CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, OLR RESEARCH REPORT: JUVENILES & THE COURTS, https://www.cga.ct.gov/ 
PS94/rpt/olr/htm/94-R-1040.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2021). 
he may have received rehabilitation services; he would 
have avoided time in an adult correctional facility; and he would have faced a max-
imum four-year term with a possible extension based on needs.160 In short, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court ignored the perfect storm that subjected Taylor G. to a 
fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence in adult prison beginning at the age of 
fourteen.161 Instead of confronting the combination of mandatory transfer provi-
sions and mandatory minimum sentencing that led to this child’s fifteen-year term 
in an adult facility, the court defended the sentence as being less bad than the worst 
case scenario of fifty-five years. Courts can and should do better by children.162 
Finally, too many courts have rejected the idea that mandatory minimums for 
children are unlawful after Miller simply on the grounds that the argument is novel. 
By the Iowa Supreme Court’s own admission: “[N]o other court in the nation has 
held that its constitution or the Federal Constitution prohibits a statutory schema 
that prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence for a juvenile offender.”163 And 
further, the Lyle court recognized that “most states permit or require some or all ju-
venile offenders to be given mandatory minimum sentences.”164 It is true that one 
state court’s decision is not binding on other states, but it is equally true that 
another state court’s decision can be persuasive authority. In light of what we 
know about children’s diminished culpability and capacity for growth, and given 
the one-two punch of automatic transfer and mandatory sentencing, courts should 
be more solicitous of defendants’ challenges to mandatory minimums after Miller. 
Courts should not put a thumb on the scale of the status quo from the late-twentieth 
century and blindly adhere to a misguided—albeit majority—approach.165 




161. Id. (outlining requirements for juveniles tried as adults); see Taylor G., 110 A.3d at 342. 
162. Taylor G., 110 A.3d at 362–87 (Eveleigh, J., dissenting). 
163. State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 386 (Iowa 2014). 
164. Id. 
165. See id. at 387 (“‘[C]onsensus is not dispositive.’” (citation omitted)). 
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CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have argued that there is a clear path for courts to find both auto-
matic transfer laws and mandatory minimums as applied to youth unlawful after 
Miller. These are indeed minority views, and by way of conclusion, I will address 
two criticisms. 
First, as I discussed supra in Part III, some judges continue to view the Miller 
trilogy through a narrow lens—they insist that it was a line of cases only about 
JLWOP, and even then, only JLWOP imposed as a result of one conviction for one 
crime, and perhaps even then, only in a context devoid of parole or clemency. Two 
rejoinders are especially relevant here. First, many courts have already expanded 
the Miller rationale to instances where the defendant received a de facto life sen-
tence and to instances where an extreme sentence is the result of aggregated term- 
of-year sentences.166 And this is because those courts have accepted the science of 
adolescent development as embraced by the Supreme Court.167 History will frown 
upon those jurists who ignore that science and insist on mechanically applying the 
narrowest version of the Miller rulings. 
Second, some criticize the capacious reading of Miller that I have articulated 
herein by making an outlier argument. That is, those who resist the science of ado-
lescent development and the fact of diminished juvenile culpability unfailingly 
point out that some kids commit very serious crimes. Those critics say, “What 
about teens who participate in a heinous homicide? How about the so-called D.C. 
Sniper? Surely those kids deserve the most serious sentences!”168 
Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Dismisses DC Sniper’s Case, CNN: POL. (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www. 
cnn.com/2020/02/26/politics/supreme-court-lee-boyd-malvo-case-dc-sniper/index.html (describing case of 
seventeen-year-old Lee Boyd Malvo, who was originally sentenced to JLWOP). 
Or, “what about 
the Twitter hacker?” they ask. “He didn’t seem very immature.”169 
Kate Conger & Nathaniel Popper, Florida Teenager Is Charged as ‘Mastermind’ of Twitter Hack, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/31/technology/twitter-hack-arrest.html (describing 
case of seventeen-year-old Graham Ivan Clark, who hacked famous Twitter accounts and is being charged as an 
adult). 
This argument 
is of no moment. Of course, it is true that some adolescents commit very serious, 
life-altering crimes and that their victims suffer tremendously. But this reality is 
also irrelevant because I am not proposing any sentencing schemes that would pre-
clude serious, potentially life-long, punishment for some adolescents. I argue that 
we should return to a default where juveniles are dealt with in juvenile court, and 
where only an informed judge can make the grave decision to transfer a child to 
adult court. Further, I simply argue that, if a judge makes that grave decision to 
transfer a child to adult court, and, if a child is convicted in adult court, then they 
should still enjoy the benefits of individualized consideration demanded by the 
166. See Drinan, supra note 3, at 59. 
167. See, e.g., State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013) (finding that juvenile’s 52.5-year minimum prison 
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Miller trilogy. Neither of those proposals precludes an extreme sentence for an out-
lier case in which a juvenile defendant is convicted in adult court of a most serious 
crime. It is true that my proposals would require more resources, care, and consid-
eration by judges and prosecutors, but it is not true that my proposals ignore the 
instances when youth commit serious crime and require proportionally serious 
sentences. 
Despite the moral import and the practical significance of the Miller trilogy, 
youth in America continue to be subject to extreme sentences. This often occurs 
not because a judge determines that the minor’s case exceeds the jurisdiction of the 
juvenile court or even because an adult criminal court judge determines that the 
minor deserves a lengthy term-of-year sentence. Rather, extreme youth sentences 
persist after Miller often because of the interplay between unbridled transfer provi-
sions and mandatory sentencing schemes. As I have argued in this Article, today, 
relying upon the language, science, and logic of the Miller trilogy, courts should 
review challenges to these two procedural elements, and their interplay, with fresh 
eyes.  
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